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Graciela L. Kaminsky1
The explosion of capital ﬂ  ows to emerging markets in the early and mid-1990s and their reversal follow-
ing the crises in Asia, Latin America and the transition economies have reignited a heated debate on the 
beneﬁ  ts and drawbacks of ﬁ  nancial globalization. Many have argued that globalization has gone too far 
and that international capital markets have become extremely erratic, with “excessive” booms and busts 
in capital ﬂ  ows triggering bubbles and ﬁ  nancial crises and magnifying the business cycle. In contrast, the 
traditional view asserts that international capital markets enhance growth and productivity by allowing 
capital to ﬂ  ow to its most attractive destination. 
Even if international capital ﬂ  ows do not trigger excess volatility in domestic ﬁ  nancial markets, 
it is still true that large capital inﬂ  ows can spark off inﬂ  ation in the presence of a ﬁ  xed exchange-rate 
regime. Moreover, transitory capital inﬂ  ows may distort relative prices, with the domestic economy losing 
competitiveness as a result of the appreciation of the real exchange rate. Therefore, it is no wonder that 
policy makers have used a variety of tools to manage these ﬂ  ows, especially ﬂ  ows of the “hot money” 
type. 
This paper re-examines the evidence on the characteristics of international capital ﬂ  ows since 
1970 and summarizes some of the ﬁ  ndings of the research conducted in the 1990s on the effects of global-
ization. It ﬁ  rst presents a brief history of international capital ﬂ  ows to emerging markets, paying particular 
attention to the volatility of bank lending and portfolio ﬂ  ows. Second, the paper reviews the literature 
on the behaviour of mutual funds specializing in emerging markets as well as the lending behaviour of 
European, Japanese and United States banks to emerging markets around the time of the Mexican, Thai 
and Russian crises. The results suggest that episodes of surge in capital inﬂ  ows do, in fact, end abruptly – 
whether owing to home-grown problems or contagion from abroad. Third, the paper reviews the evidence 
on the short- and long-run effects of ﬁ  nancial deregulation on ﬁ  nancial and real cycles. Interestingly, the 
stylized evidence suggests that although ﬁ  nancial liberalization may trigger excessive booms and busts in 
the short-run, ﬁ  nancial markets tend to stabilize and growth accelerates in the long run. This section also 
examines brieﬂ  y the linkages between globalization and institutional reform. Fourth, the paper reviews 
the literature on managing international capital ﬂ  ows. The conclusion summarizes what we know about 
ﬁ  nancial globalization and examines policy options. 
1  This paper draws on previous research with Richard Lyons, Carmen Reinhart, Sergio Schmukler and 
Carlos Végh. The paper was previously circulated under the title “Volatile International Capital Flows: 
A Blessing or a Curse?” I would like to thank José Antonio Ocampo for his very useful comments, and 
Victor Cheng and Nilanjana Sarkar for their excellent research assistance. 2  DESA Working Paper No. 10
A brief history of capital ﬂ  ows
The 1970s witnessed a remarkable boom of capital ﬂ  ows to emerging economies. The dramatic surge in 
international capital ﬂ  ows was triggered by the oil shock in 1973-1974, the growth of the Eurodollar mar-
ket and the remarkable increase in bank lending during 1979-1981. Latin America was the main recipient 
of this heavy capital inﬂ  ow, with capital ﬂ  ows to the region peaking at US$44 billion in 1981 (see ﬁ  gure 
1). Overall, capital inﬂ  ows to this region, which mostly took the form of syndicated bank loans (see ﬁ  gure 
2), reached about 6 per cent of the region’s gross domestic product (GDP). The pace of international 
lending came to an abrupt end in 1982 with the hike in world real interest rates to levels not seen since the 
1930s. Suddenly, emerging countries became the pariahs of international capital markets and they were 
not only excluded from voluntary capital markets but also forced to run current-account surpluses to repay 
their foreign debts.
By the late 1980s, there was a revival of international lending. While ﬂ  ows to Latin America 
made a tremendous comeback, capital inﬂ  ows to Asia also surged, with capital ﬂ  ows increasing tenfold 
from their averages in the early 1980s. This time, however, the composition of capital ﬂ  ows changed, 
bank lending having been replaced by foreign direct investment (FDI) and portfolio investment. Bank 
Figure 1:
Private capital flows to emerging markets
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Source: World Economic Outlook 2005
Note: The countries comprising Asia 
are Bangladesh, China, Hong Kong, 
India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, 
the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, 
Taiwan, Thailand and Viet Nam.
The countries comprising Latin America 
are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, the 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, 
Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.
The countries comprising the transition 
economies are Albania, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, Poland, 
Romania, Russia, Serbia and Montenegro, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
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Source: World Economic Outlook 2005
Note: The countries comprising Asia are Bangladesh, China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Singapore, South 
Korea, Taiwan, Thailand and Viet Nam.
The countries comprising Latin America are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru, 
Uruguay and Venezuela.
The countries comprising the transition economies are Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Russia, 
Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.4  DESA Working Paper No. 10
lending to both Asia and Latin America declined from 70 per cent of net private capital ﬂ  ows in the 1970s 
to about 20 per cent in the 1990s. While FDI constituted the largest share of capital ﬂ  ow to Asia and Latin 
America, portfolio investment (bonds and equity) also increased substantially, accounting for up to 40 per 
cent of total capital ﬂ  ows in the mid-1990s. In absolute terms, bond and equity ﬂ  ows to Asia (excluding 
those counted as FDI) increased to US$27 billion in 1993 while those to Latin American peaked at US$69 
billion in 1994. 
As in the 1980s, booms in the 1990s were followed by capital ﬂ  ow reversals. The ﬁ  rst reversal 
occurred in the immediate aftermath of Mexico’s currency crisis in December 1994. For most countries, 
however, capital ﬂ  ows resumed within a year and returned to their peak values soon thereafter. In the 
aftermath of that crisis, capital ﬂ  ows to Asian economies were essentially not affected, the crisis being 
conﬁ  ned to a small number of Latin American countries. The second, more severe reversal came in 1997 
during the Asian crisis. This reversal was later aggravated by the Russian default in August 1998 and the 
Brazilian crisis in 1998-1999. This time, the collapse in capital ﬂ  ows was more pronounced and sustained. 
The reversal was similar in magnitude to the one witnessed after the debt crisis, with total capital ﬂ  ows 
to Latin America declining by about 31 per cent in 1998 and declining further by 47 per cent in 1999. 
The sudden stop in capital ﬂ  ows to Asia was more pronounced, with total capital ﬂ  ows declining from an 
inﬂ  ow of US$120 billion in 1996 to an outﬂ  ow of US$50 billion in 1998. The reversal of short-term port-
folio ﬂ  ows to Asia (bonds, equities and bank lending) was equally as severe, with ﬂ  ows declining from 
an inﬂ  ow of US$52 billion in 1996 to an outﬂ  ow of US$92 billion in 1998. In Latin America, short-term 
capital ﬂ  ows declined from an approximate inﬂ  ow of US$30 billion in 1996 to an approximate outﬂ  ow of 
US$31 billion in 2000.2
The evidence from transition economies is similar to that of Asia and Latin America. In the mid 
1990s, capital ﬂ  ows boomed, peaking at US$33 billion in 1998. Portfolio bond and equity ﬂ  ows and bank 
lending suffered a signiﬁ  cant reversal in the late 1990s, with private capital ﬂ  ows declining to US$16 bil-
lion. Capital ﬂ  ows to all emerging markets resumed only in 2003 following the decline in interest rates in 
industrial countries.
The behaviour of mutual funds
The booms and busts in international capital ﬂ  ows have brought international investors to the limelight. 
International investors are often seen as the main culprits of ﬁ  nancial market instability and have even been 
the subject of attacks by government ofﬁ  cials. Many have argued that, more often than not, international 
investors panic and withdraw funds from countries with sound fundamentals. Assessing the behaviour of 
international investors has been a daunting task because data on international investors’ portfolios is almost 
non-existent. Only recently has a novel databank on mutual fund portfolios provided by Emerging Market 
Funds Research, Inc. become available for research. This databank covers the positions of nearly 1,400 
international emerging market equity fund, with an average position of about US$120 billion in 1996. It 
2  This paper is restricted to the analysis of portfolio and bank-related ﬂ  ows. Still, it is important to note that in con-
trast to the booms and sudden stops in portfolio and bank ﬂ  ows, FDI to emerging markets continuously increased 
even in the midst of currency turmoil (in part driven by purchases of ﬁ  rms in distress following the crises). This 
led many to single out FDI as a stabilizing ﬂ  ow (see, for example, Reisen and Soto (2001) and Sarno and Taylor 
(1999)) and to support policies encouraging FDI. This reasoning has been challenged by Claessens, Dooley and 
Warner (1995), who emphasize that capital-ﬂ  ow labels are meaningless in the presence of derivatives or efforts to 
circumvent capital controls.International Capital Flows, Financial Stability and Growth  5
includes United States registered and offshore funds as well as funds registered in Luxembourg, the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Ireland, the Cayman Islands, Canada and Switzerland. 
Both open- and closed-end funds are also included in this dataset, which starts at 1995. Kaminsky, Lyons 
and Schmukler (2002) and Borenzstein and Gelos (2003) have used this dataset to study the behaviour of 
funds specializing in emerging markets. In particular, they examine whether domestic fragility is at the 
heart of portfolio decisions by mutual fund managers or whether mutual funds just herd together. 
Kaminsky, Lyons and Schmukler describe the evolution of mutual funds in Asia, Latin America 
and transition economies and then examine the determinants of mutual fund ﬂ  ows to these regions. Their 
ﬁ  ndings are presented in ﬁ  gures 3 and 4 and in table 1. Figure 3 shows the average quarterly net ﬂ  ows to 
these regions from 1995 to 1999. Mutual fund ﬂ  ows to emerging markets peaked in the second quarter 
of 1997, reaching about US$8 billion. Overall, booms in mutual fund ﬂ  ows were followed by reversals. 
Reversals were not persistent after the Tequila crisis. Outﬂ  ows from Latin America reached about US$4 
billion in 1995, but mutual funds increased their positions in Latin America by about US$2 billion in the 
ﬁ  rst half of 1996. The Tequila crisis did not have any spillovers in Asia or in transition economies. In fact, 
ﬂ  ows to Asia ballooned to almost US$11 billion in 1996, while ﬂ  ows to transition economies remained 
stable throughout 1995-1996. The picture changed after the Asian crisis. This time, mutual funds pulled 
out not only from Asia but also from Latin America, with net outﬂ  ows in the latter region reaching about 
US$1 billion in the six months following the collapse of the Thai baht. Mutual fund withdrawals took a 
turn for the worse in 1998, reaching about US$4 billion in Asia and also in Latin America, with substan-
tial outﬂ  ows from transition economies after the Russian crisis. 
Figure 3:
Mutual funds: quarterly flows to emerging countries























































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Kaminsky, Lyons and Schmukler 
(2002).
Note: Latin America includes Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and 
Venezuela.
Asia includes China, Hong Kong, India, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, the 
Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, 
Sri Lanka, Taiwan and Thailand.
Transition economies include 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, the 
Czech Republic, Georgia, Hungary, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, 
Poland, Russia, Slovakia, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. 6  DESA Working Paper No. 10
Figure 4 assesses the problem of the sudden stops in times of ﬁ  nancial turmoil. It reports the aver-
age quarterly ﬂ  ows (as a percentage of the mutual funds’ initial positions) to countries in Asia and Latin 
America, as well as to transition economies in the two quarters following three crises. The top panel looks 
at the aftermath of the Mexican devaluation in December 1994, the middle panel examines the aftermath 
of the collapse of the Thai baht in July 1997, and the bottom panel studies the aftermath of the Russian 
devaluation and moratorium in August 1998. To capture the magnitude of the sudden-stop syndrome, this 
ﬁ  gure reports total ﬂ  ows relative to average ﬂ  ows (also as percentages of their initial positions) during the 
whole sample (1995-1999). Following the Mexican devaluation, for example, mutual funds sold about 5 
per cent of their Brazilian positions (relative to their average quarterly buying/selling from 1995 to 1999). 
Thus, as shown in the ﬁ  rst panel in ﬁ  gure 3, Brazil experienced unusual withdrawals of about 5 per cent 
in the aftermath of the Mexican devaluation. As shown in the last panel, Malaysia was the country most 
affected in the aftermath of the Russian crisis, with abnormal outﬂ  ows of approximately 30 per cent. 
The extent of the mutual fund sudden stop in the aftermath of the three crises was substantially 
different. The so-called Tequila Crisis was circumscribed to Latin America. Moreover, “abnormal” mutual 
fund withdrawals in the aftermath of the collapse of the Mexican peso were conﬁ  ned to a handful of Latin 
American countries, with only Brazil and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela – besides the crisis coun-
Figure 4:
Mutual fund flows: global spillovers
After the Mexican crisis
After the Thai crisis

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Kaminsky, Lyons and Schmukler 
(2002).International Capital Flows, Financial Stability and Growth  7
try, Mexico – suffering average withdrawals of 5 and 2 per cent, respectively, in the two quarters follow-
ing the devaluation. In contrast, mutual funds increased their exposure to Asian countries and transition 
economies, with (above-trend) ﬂ  ows oscillating around 4 per cent for Asia and 11 per cent for the transi-
tion economies. 
The aftermath of the collapse of the Thai baht presents a different picture of the international 
mutual funds industry. It is in this episode that we ﬁ  rst observe signs of a more general retrenchment of 
mutual funds in emerging markets. Mutual fund ﬂ  ows to Asian economies were well below trend in the 
two quarters following the collapse of the Thai baht. Only ﬂ  ows to China, Pakistan and Sri Lanka were 
above average. Interestingly, after the collapse of the Thai baht, we observe substantial withdrawals from 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Singapore and Taiwan Province of China, with average quar-
terly withdrawals oscillating at about 12 per cent above average in the case of Singapore and Taiwan and 
about 7 per cent for Hong Kong. The retrenchment this time also affected Latin America and the transition 
economies, with withdrawals reaching about 6 per cent for Colombia and 4 per cent for the Czech Repub-
lic during the two quarters following the outbreak of the Thai crisis. Colombia, the Czech Republic, Chile, 
Hungary and Peru were the countries most affected in this episode, with sales averaging about 3 per cent 
above average. 
The ﬂ  ight away from emerging markets became more pronounced during the Russian crisis, with 
about half of the countries in the sample experiencing abnormal sales of about 10 per cent or even larger. 
In some cases, withdrawals were massive. For example, average mutual funds sales (relative to trend) in 
Malaysia reached 30 per cent while those in the Czech Republic were in the order of 16 per cent. Some 
Latin American countries were also dramatically affected in the aftermath of the Russian collapse. Co-
lombia and Venezuela, for example, suffered average quarterly outﬂ  ows of about 8 per cent. Mutual funds 
investments in Mexico and Peru were the only ones that did not suffer following the worldwide turmoil 
Table 1.
The behavior of mutual funds during crises
Region
The Mexican crisis The Thai crisis The Russian crisis
Percentage of countries with Percentage of countries with Percentage of countries with
Fragility
Liquid 
ﬁ  nancial 
markets Risk Fragility
Liquid 
ﬁ  nancial 
markets Risk Fragility
Liquid 
ﬁ  nancial 
markets Risk
Asia
  With MF withdrawals .. .. .. 43 86 29 40 40 60
  Without MF withdrawals 0 42 25 25 0 25 0 100 0
Latin America
  With MF withdrawals 67 33 67 75 50 25 50 100 0
  Without MF withdrawals 0 67 33 0 100 0 20 60 0
Transition economies
  With MF withdrawals  .. 0 0 100 100 33 50 33 0
  Without MF withdrawals 33 75 50 0 50 0 100 0 100
Source: Kaminsky, Lyons and Schmukler (2002).
Note: This table relates the mutual fund (MF) withdrawals (injections) of funds to the emerging markets shown in ﬁ  gure 4 with indicators of 
fragility, liquidity of ﬁ  nancial markets, and economic and political risk in those economies.
.. Data not available.8  DESA Working Paper No. 10
triggered by the Russian default. In fact, inﬂ  ows to Mexico were 5 per cent above the average observed in 
the 1995-1999 period.
 Table 1 examines in detail why some countries were severely affected by mutual fund withdraw-
als while others were left unscathed. Three factors are examined: economic fragility, liquidity of ﬁ  nancial 
markets3 and economic and political risk. Fragility is captured using the probabilities of crises (Kaminsky, 
1998) that measure the likelihood of crises conditional on eighteen indicators reﬂ  ecting macroeconomic 
vulnerabilities in each country. These indicators provide information about ﬁ  scal and monetary imbal-
ances, ﬁ  nancial and real vulnerabilities, current-account and capital-account problems and world factors. 
Fiscal deﬁ  cits and monetary imbalances are captured by means of two indicators: ﬁ  scal deﬁ  cit/
GDP ratio and excess M1 real balances (supply of money relative to money demand). Current-account 
problems are captured by four indicators: exports, imports, real exchange rates (deviations from equi-
librium) and terms of trade. Capital-account problems (debt problems) are captured by two indicators: 
foreign-exchange reserves of the central bank, and the foreign debt/exports and short-term debt/foreign-
exchange reserves ratios. Real vulnerability is captured by two indicators: output and real interest rates. 
Financial vulnerability is captured by six indicators: domestic credit/GDP ratio, M2/reserves ratio, depos-
its, M2 multiplier, stock prices and an index of banking crises. Finally, world factors are captured by one 
indicator: the world interest rate. A country is classiﬁ  ed as fragile if the probability of a crisis is higher 
than 50 per cent; otherwise it is considered healthy. 
Liquidity is captured by means of four indicators. The ﬁ  rst one – the volume traded in the stock 
market – provides an overall measure of the size and depth of the stock market. The second one – the 
share of the mutual funds portfolio in each country at the onset of the crisis – is related to mutual funds 
liquidity in each country, since investors cannot sell in countries in which they have basically no expo-
sure. These ﬁ  rst two indicators provide two different pictures of liquidity of ﬁ  nancial markets. The third 
indicator dates the time when ﬁ  rms in emerging markets start to trade in mature and more liquid ﬁ  nancial 
markets. The fourth indicator captures the ability of investors to rapidly change their portfolio in a particu-
lar country. In particular, this last indicator evaluates the extent of restrictions to capital mobility in each 
country. Restrictions could add “sand in the wheels” of capital markets and thus curtail liquidity.4 
Finally, the risk indicator captures both political and economic uncertainty. The political risk indi-
cator captures uncertainty due to expected changes of authorities or future policy actions. It also identiﬁ  es 
3  Liquidity may have an important effect on investors’ portfolio allocations since investors may want to avoid illiq-
uid markets to minimize the price collapses always present when there is no ready market. 
4  To identify liquid markets, countries are ranked by region according to their volume traded and accord-
ing to their share in the mutual funds portfolio at the onset of the crisis. The dummy variable related 
to volume traded is given a value of one if the country ranks among the top 30 per cent of most liquid 
countries in the region in that category, and a value of zero otherwise. Similarly, countries are classi-
ﬁ  ed as liquid (that is to say, the dummy variable is given a value of one) if they rank among the 30 per 
cent of the countries with the largest share in mutual fund portfolios for the region. A third dummy is 
created to capture whether emerging market ﬁ  rms are trading in mature ﬁ  nancial markets: the variable 
is given a value of one if they do, and zero if they do not. Finally, the variable capturing restrictions to 
entry and exit of foreigners in the stock markets of emerging economies is given a value of one if there 
are no restrictions, and zero if there are. All of this information is collapsed into a liquidity variable that 
is the average of the four univariate liquidity dummy variables. Thus, the general index of liquidity, the 
average of the four components, can have ﬁ  ve values: 0, 1/4, 2/4, 3/4 and 1, with a value of one indicat-
ing a highly liquid market. I classify a country as having liquid ﬁ  nancial markets when this dummy 
takes a value of 0.5 or higher. International Capital Flows, Financial Stability and Growth  9
widespread social unrest. The risk indicator also captures economic risk, such as imposition of restrictions 
to capital mobility in response to crises. A country is classiﬁ  ed as risky when there is at least either politi-
cal or economic risk. 
Table 1 shows the characteristics of countries that suffer abnormal withdrawals and injections in 
the aftermath of the three crises.5 The table groups the countries into three regions: Asia, Latin America 
and transition economies. As shown in the ﬁ  rst column, countries with fragile economies constitute the 
bulk of the countries that suffer withdrawals. During the Mexican crisis, for example, Latin America 
was the only region that suffered withdrawals. Interestingly, 67 per cent of the countries that suffered 
withdrawals in this episode were also countries with deteriorated fundamentals. Again, during the Thai 
crisis, at least 75 per cent of the countries that suffered withdrawals in the transition economies group and 
Latin America were countries with economic vulnerabilities. Similarly, 43 per cent of the Asian countries 
affected by abnormal withdrawals also had deteriorated economies. The Republic of Korea (South Ko-
rea), Colombia, the Czech Republic and Chile, for example, suffered huge withdrawals in the aftermath 
of the Thai crisis – the Czech Republic and South Korea were the two most vulnerable countries during 
the Asian crisis (Thailand ranked fourth) in the sample of 25 countries, while Colombia ranked sixth. In 
contrast, countries that did not experience mutual fund withdrawals were less fragile in general (see Gold-
stein, Kaminsky and Reinhart 2001). 
Domestic fragilities were not the only explanation for the sudden-stop syndrome, however. China, 
for example, did not even suffer a mild hiccup in the midst of the Asian crisis even when devaluation fears 
were widespread among investors and the vulnerability of its ﬁ  nancial system was widely known. In con-
trast, Singapore, Taiwan and Hong Kong – countries with the most liquid ﬁ  nancial markets in the region 
– suffered pronounced capital-ﬂ  ow reversals even when their economies looked far healthier than that 
of China. Overall, 86 per cent of the countries in the Asia-Paciﬁ  c region that suffered withdrawals were 
countries with quite liquid ﬁ  nancial markets. In contrast, all the countries in that region unaffected by the 
Thai crisis had illiquid ﬁ  nancial markets. 
Finally, risk also had an important role, with 40 per cent of the countries most affected by with-
drawals also experiencing political and economic risk. In 1994, for example, in the midst of the banking 
crisis, Venezuela abandoned convertibility. Far from discouraging capital outﬂ  ows, the implementation 
of restrictions to capital mobility seems to have also contributed to the ﬁ  re sales of Venezuelan assets. 
Malaysia suffered substantial losses in the aftermath of the Russian crisis when it introduced outright 
controls on capital outﬂ  ows. Interestingly, the withdrawals may have been triggered by the increased risk 
– perceived or real – associated with the country. 
Borenzstein and Gelos (2003) provide complementary results that help characterize the behav-
iour of mutual funds in emerging markets. The authors examine whether mutual funds follow herding 
strategies using Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny’s (1992) measure of herding, a measure that allows an 
assessment of whether funds move in the same direction more often than one would expect than if they 
had traded independently and randomly. Borenzstein and Gelos’ results suggest that mutual funds do herd 
together. In particular, for a given country, the number of funds moving in the same direction was approxi-
mately 8 per cent greater than one would have expected had they acted independently. Herding is less pro-
nounced among closed-end funds, suggesting that herding behaviour might be traceable to the behaviour 
5  See Kaminsky, Lyons and Schmukler (2002) for a country-by-country detail on fragility, liquidity, risk and mutual 
fund withdrawals.10  DESA Working Paper No. 10
of individual investors rather than that of fund managers. Finally, herding in some crisis episodes was also 
more pronounced. At the onset of the Brazilian crisis, for example, herding on Brazilian assets increased 
to 15 per cent. 
The behaviour of banks
As shown earlier, bank-related lending has been quite volatile in the last three decades. This section ex-
amines the role of European, Japanese and United States banks in spreading the crises of the 1990s. The 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS) Consolidated Banking Statistics are used to examine the role 
of the three international banking clusters. In particular, international claims of reporting BIS banks in 
emerging economies, including both total cross-border claims and local claims in foreign currency booked 
by foreign ofﬁ  ces, are studied. The difference between total cross-border claims and international claims 
is quite wide for countries with highly dollarized economies and with an important presence of foreign 
banks, such as Latin American countries. 
As shown in ﬁ  gure 5, bank ﬂ  ows poured into Asia throughout most of the 1990s and accelerated 
following the Mexican crisis. Bank loans to emerging Asia expanded by 89 per cent from June 1994 to 
Figure 5:
Bank lending to Asia, Latin America 
and the transition economies
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Source: Bank for International Settlements.
Note: Asia includes Afghanistan, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, British 
Overseas Territories, Brunei, Cambodia, 
China, Fiji, French Polynesia, Georgia, India, 
Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, Kyrgyzstan, 
Laos, Macau, Malaysia, the Maldives, 
Mongolia, Myanmar, Nauru, Nepal, New 
Caledonia, North Korea, Pakistan, Papua 
New Guinea, the Philippines, the Solomon 
Islands, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, 
Tajikistan, Thailand, Tonga, Turkmenistan, 
Tuvalu, the U.S. Paciﬁ  c Islands, Uzbekistan, 
Viet Nam, Wallis Futuna and Western 
Samoa.
Latin America includes Argentina, Belize, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Cuba, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, the Falkland Islands, 
Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, 
Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Paraguay, Peru, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, 
Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Turks and 
Caicos, Uruguay and Venezuela.
Transition economies include Albania, 
Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, 
Czechoslovakia, Estonia, the German 
Democratic Republic, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Macedonia, Malta, Moldova, 
Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia and 
Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, the Soviet 
Union, Turkey and Ukraine.International Capital Flows, Financial Stability and Growth  11
June 1997. Part of the rise in lending was due to the European banks’ goal of achieving a higher proﬁ  le 
in emerging markets, particularly in South Korea. Much of the lending boom, especially in the case of 
Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea, was due to a rapid expansion in credit from Japanese banks. Faced 
with a slumping economy and little domestic loan demand, Japanese banks increasingly looked overseas 
to the rapidly growing economies of Southeast Asia as potential borrowers. United States bank lending 
to Asia was modest before the crisis. By June 1997, the United States banks’ positions in emerging Asia 
had only reached US$32 billion and only accounted for 20 per cent of all United States bank lending to 
developing countries. In contrast, by the onset of the Thai crisis, Japanese banks had exposure to Asia four 
times as much as United States banks (US$124 billion). European bank lending to emerging Asia was also 
signiﬁ  cant and, by the onset of the Thai crisis, the exposure of European banks to Asia surpassed that of 
Japanese banks, reaching US$161 billion. The exposure of European banks to emerging Asia accounted 
for about a half of all their lending to emerging markets; South Korea alone accounted for 40 per cent of 
their lending to the developing world.
Japanese banks, heavily exposed to Thailand, were the ﬁ  rst to pull out of emerging Asia. Between 
June and December of 1997, lending by Japanese banks fell by 8 per cent. European banks, heavily ex-
posed to South Korea, only began to pull out following the start of the crisis in that country in November 
1997. In net terms, European bank lending to Asia continued to increase from June to December 1997. By 
June 1998, however, lending to emerging Asia was reduced across the board. Bank lending to Asia fell by 
US$46 billion, with European banks recalling US$12 billion, Japanese banks US$25 billion and United 
States banks US$9 billion, respectively. 
Figure 5 also reports bank lending to Latin America and transition economies. Exposure to these 
regions increased sharply in the mid 1990s (in large part driven by the purchase of domestic banks by 
European banks), with claims on these regions increasing by about 50 per cent from June 1994 to June 
1998, immediately before the onset of the Russian crisis. During the 1990s, European banks had the larg-
est exposure to these regions – accounting for 67 per cent to Latin America and 84 per cent to transition 
economies. The Russian crisis led to some withdrawals of Japanese and United States lending from both 
regions, but this was not the case with European banks that had acquired local banks. Total exposure to 
Latin America by European banks peaked in December 2000 and has not recovered since. 
Figures 6-8 tally country-by-country bank ﬂ  ows originating in European, Japanese and United 
States banks in the aftermath of the Mexican, Thai and Russian crises. Each ﬁ  gure focuses on the year fol-
lowing the crisis. Figure 6 shows that with the exception of Mexico and Venezuela (which had a banking 
crisis of its own making), Latin American countries did not suffer major reversals in bank lending fol-
lowing the Mexican crisis. Moreover, within a year of the crisis, lending to Latin America recovered and 
even surpassed the levels observed before the crisis. Brazil was the prime beneﬁ  ciary of bank ﬂ  ows during 
1995, with lending from European and United States banks reaching US$15 billion. Even in the case of 
Mexico and Venezuela, withdrawals were not made across the board. Only United States banks recalled 
loans from these countries. Figure 6 also shows that in Asia, the major recipients of capital ﬂ  ows in 1995 
were South Korea, Thailand and Indonesia. 
Figure 7 shows the behaviour of bank lending in the aftermath of the Thai crisis. In contrast to 
the Tequila crisis, the Thai crisis triggered major reversals in bank ﬂ  ows from banks in Europe, Japan and 
the United States. Thailand, South Korea, Indonesia and Malaysia were the countries that suffered major 12  DESA Working Paper No. 10
withdrawals. Contagion was only regional in nature, with almost all of the Latin American countries, and 
to a lesser degree, transition economies, continuing to have uninterrupted access to bank lending. 
Figure 8 presents spillovers from the Russian crisis. As was the case with mutual funds, the 
reversal in bank lending following the Russian default was not restricted to the Russian Federation or 
neighbouring countries. This time, the reversal was more widespread, and affected countries as far away 
as Brazil and South Africa. While Japanese banks continued to recall loans from Thailand, Indonesia and 
South Korea, reversals were not just restricted to these countries. Japanese banks, as well as United States 
banks, also recalled loans from Brazil, Mexico, India and South Africa. 
More formal evidence below suggests that international banks were at the centre of ﬁ  nancial con-
tagion in the late 1990s. Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) examine contagion during the debt crisis in 1982, 
the Mexican crisis in 1994 and the Asian crisis in 1997, and ﬁ  nd that United States banks were at the core 
of the contagion during the debt crisis, while Japanese banks spread the Thai crisis to Indonesia, South 
Korea and Malaysia. Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) examine the Tequila, Asian and Russian crises 
and the ﬂ  ows to 31 emerging countries from 17 BIS country-creditor banks. Their evidence supports the 
idea that the degree to which countries compete for funds from common bank lenders is a fairly robust 
Figure 6:
Bank flows: global spillovers after the Mexican crisis
—December 1994-December 1995
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Bank for International Settlements.International Capital Flows, Financial Stability and Growth  13
predictor of the incidence of contagion. Finally, Caramazza, Ricci and Salgado (2000) extend earlier work 
on indicators of vulnerability to currency crises by examining the role of ﬁ  nancial linkages while control-
ling for the roles of internal and external macroeconomic imbalances and trade spillovers. Their results 
indicate that ﬁ  nancial links do matter while exchange-rate regimes and controls on capital ﬂ  ows do not 
seem to.
Globalization and volatility
As discussed in the introduction, the views on the effects of ﬁ  nancial globalization have been diverse; 
there are those who defend capital controls (Rodrik, 1998; Stiglitz, 1999) and those who maintain that 
capital should be allowed to move freely (Dornbusch, 1998). The rationale for restricting international 
capital ﬂ  ows is grounded in the belief that market failures and distortions pervade capital markets around 
the world. One of the most frequently cited distortions is that of asymmetric information, which is ram-
pant in international capital markets due to geographical and cultural differences that complicate the task 
of obtaining information. In addition, imperfections in international markets are magniﬁ  ed by the difﬁ  cul-
Figure 7:
Bank flows: global spillovers after the Thai crisis
—June 1997-June 1998



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Bank for International Settlements.14  DESA Working Paper No. 10
ties in enforcing contracts across borders.6 With imperfect information, investors may overreact to shocks; 
withdrawing massively from countries at the ﬁ  rst signs of economic problems or becoming euphoric and 
pouring in capital in quantities beyond those justiﬁ  ed by “good” fundamentals. On the other hand, those 
who consider international capital markets to be efﬁ  cient favour unrestricted capital movements. Financial 
liberalization is believed to improve the functioning of ﬁ  nancial systems, increasing the availability of 
funds and allowing cross-country risk diversiﬁ  cation. Moreover, it is also claimed that ﬁ  nancial integra-
tion tends to facilitate economic growth. 
This section will summarize some of the ﬁ  ndings in the literature on the effects of globalization 
on ﬁ  nancial markets and the real economy, paying particular attention to the evidence on these conﬂ  ict-
ing views. In particular, the section will focus on the short- and long-run effects of ﬁ  nancial integration on 
real and ﬁ  nancial volatility. 
6  For an excellent discussion on the effects of asymmetric information in assets markets, see Eichengreen and Mussa 
(1998).
Figure 8:
Bank flows: global spillovers after the Russian crisis
—June 1998-June 1999
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Financial markets
The evidence from the crises of the 1990s suggests that crises are preceded by “excessive” capital in-
ﬂ  ows that, in turn, fuel large expansions in domestic credit and bubbles in ﬁ  nancial markets (see, for 
example, Sachs, Velasco, and Tornell, 1996). There is also evidence that most episodes of banking crises 
are preceded by ﬁ  nancial liberalization (see, for example, Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Demirguc-Kunt 
and Detragiache, 1999). To reconcile the evidence that globalization is at the heart of ﬁ  nancial crises with 
the hypothesis that international capital markets allow capital to move to its most attractive destination 
and promote more stable ﬁ  nancial markets, Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002) examine the possible time-
varying effects of ﬁ  nancial liberalization on stock market price cycles.7 Figure 9 reproduces some of the 
results in that paper. The ﬁ  gure shows the average amplitude of booms and crashes for fourteen emerging 
markets8 during periods of repression, the short-run effects of liberalization and the long-run effects of 
liberalization. 
The evidence in this ﬁ  gure seems to point to excessive cycles, with larger booms followed by 
larger crashes in the immediate aftermath of ﬁ  nancial liberalization. Liberalization does not permanently 
bring about more volatile ﬁ  nancial markets, however. If liberalization persists, stock markets in emerg-
ing countries become more stable. One possible explanation examined in the paper (using a variety of 
measures of law and order) is that ﬁ  nancial liberalization triggers institutional reforms that make ﬁ  nan-
cial markets function better. Interestingly, the evidence for the fourteen emerging countries indicates that 
deregulation indeed preceded institutional reforms. This sequence may be due to the actions of domes-
tic investors who, having access to international capital markets following deregulation, demand better 
7  In order to date the episodes of ﬁ  nancial liberalization, we construct a chronology of ﬁ  nancial liberalization in the 
domestic ﬁ  nancial sector, the capital account, and the domestic stock market. The chronology allows for episodes 
of partial and full liberalization.
8  The fourteen emerging economies are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Hong Kong, Indonesia, South Korea, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, the Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand and Venezuela.
Figure 9:
Average amplitude of booms and crashes 











Repression Short-run liberalization Long-run liberalization
Source: Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002).16  DESA Working Paper No. 10
enforcement rules to continue to invest in domestic ﬁ  nancial markets. As suggested by Stultz (1999), the 
liberalization and gradual integration of emerging markets into international ﬁ  nancial markets may help 
strengthen the domestic ﬁ  nancial sector, as foreign investors generally have better skills and more infor-
mation and can thus monitor management in ways that local investors cannot. Liberalization also allows 
ﬁ  rms to access mature capital markets. Firms listed on foreign stock markets are in the jurisdiction of a 
superior legal system with higher disclosure standards that will promote more transparency in the man-
agement of the ﬁ  rm and can trigger improvements in corporate governance.
Business cycles and growth 
The evidence in the previous section is suggestive of excessive booms and busts in ﬁ  nancial markets 
in developing countries following globalization but of more stable ﬁ  nancial markets in the long run if 
globalization persists. This section will examine the relationship between globalization and business cycle 
ﬂ  uctuations and growth. 
First, the section presents a study of business cycle characteristics of international capital ﬂ  ows. 
Figure 10 shows international capital ﬂ  ows to emerging markets in Asia, Latin America and transition 
economies, as well as annual output growth rates. The panels suggest that capital ﬂ  ows have been pro-
Figure 10:
Private capital flows to emerging markets and 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook 
database.
Note: The countries comprising Asia 
are Bangladesh, China, Hong Kong, 
India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, 
the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, 
Taiwan, Thailand and Viet Nam.
The countries comprising the transition 
economies are Albania, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, Poland, 
Romania, Russia, Serbia and Montenegro, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
Ukraine and Uzbekistan.
The countries comprising Latin America 
are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, the 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, 
Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.International Capital Flows, Financial Stability and Growth  17
cyclical, with large inﬂ  ows in good times and outﬂ  ows during recessions. For example, Latin America’s 
growth rates oscillated at around 4.5 per cent in periods of capital inﬂ  ows, while growth rates were about 1 
per cent in periods of sudden stops. Similarly, Asia’s economic activity collapsed to about 5.5 per cent after 
the sudden stop in capital ﬂ  ows in the late 1990s, after growing at an average annual growth rate of 8.5 per 
cent during the earlier period of large capital inﬂ  ows. This evidence contrasts sharply with the prescrip-
tion that international capital markets should allow countries to smooth out the effect of the business cycle. 
Countries seem to have lost access to international credit markets during recessions on a systematic basis. 
This non-optimal behaviour of international capital ﬂ  ows has also been studied by Calvo and 
Izquierdo (2003), who observe that sudden reversals in capital ﬂ  ows to emerging economies lead to 
large real depreciations and profound downturns. Perhaps what makes these sudden reversals even more 
devastating is that they seem to trigger contractionary macro-policies. As shown in ﬁ  gure 11, for example, 
Peru introduced austerity programs in the early 1980s and in the late 1980s in the aftermath of debt and 
currency crises. In contrast, the United Kingdom pursued counter-cyclical policy in the aftermath of the 
1992 European Monetary System (EMS) currency crisis when the pound was allowed to ﬂ  oat. While Peru 
lost access to international capital markets, the United Kingdom did not. These are not isolated cases. As 
reported in Kaminsky, Reinhart and Végh (2004), macro-policies tend to be pro-cyclical in developing 
countries while they are counter-cyclical or acyclical in industrialized countries. That is to say, macro-pol-
icies tend to smooth out the business cycle in industrial countries but magnify it in developing countries, 
as shown in table 2. The left panel in this Table reports the correlation between the cyclical components of 
ﬁ  scal and monetary policy with the business cycle. The right panel shows the correlations of the cyclical 
components of ﬁ  scal and monetary policy with net capital inﬂ  ows. Interestingly, the evidence suggests 
that international capital ﬂ  ows to developing countries may trigger pro-cyclical macro-policies. Govern-
ment expenditure (inﬂ  ation tax) is positively (negatively) correlated with net capital inﬂ  ows, for example, 
indicating that periods of capital inﬂ  ows are associated with expansionary ﬁ  scal policies and periods of 
capital outﬂ  ows with contractionary ﬁ  scal policies. While more research is needed, the stylized evidence 
suggests that international capital ﬂ  ows may trigger more volatile business cycles in emerging economies.
Figure 11:
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Notes: These ﬁ  gures show the cyclical component of government consumption and GDP obtained using the band-pass ﬁ  lter. The correlations 
are the sample correlations.18  DESA Working Paper No. 10
While this evidence points to links between ﬁ  nancial integration and output instability over the 
business cycle, there is also evidence that ﬁ  nancial integration promotes growth. A variety of authors have 
examined the effects of domestic and external deregulation of ﬁ  nancial markets in emerging economies 
and found that they generally trigger sustainable growth in the long run. Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad 
(2002), for example, examine the effects of the opening of the stock market to foreign investors on growth 
in a sample of about 90 developing countries and ﬁ  nd that, overall, liberalization triggers an increase in 
growth by approximately one percentage point. They ﬁ  nd that the investment to GDP ratio increases in 
the aftermath of liberalization and that factor productivity increases signiﬁ  cantly as well. The authors 
conclude that the effects of liberalization are so strong not only because they reduce ﬁ  nancing constraints 
but also because foreign investors may insist on better corporate governance thus indirectly reducing the 
cost of external ﬁ  nancing. 
Similarly, Galindo, Micco and Ordoñez (2002) study whether ﬁ  nancial liberalization promotes 
economic growth by analyzing its effect on the cost of external ﬁ  nancing to ﬁ  rms. In particular, the hy-
pothesis is that the liberalization of domestic and external ﬁ  nancial markets reduces the cost of external 
funds faced by ﬁ  rms by reducing the impact of problems associated with moral hazard and adverse selec-
tion. From this perspective, the impact of ﬁ  nancial development differs according to the needs of par-
ticular ﬁ  rms for external funds. Firms that rely more on external funds will be more heavily impacted by 
ﬁ  nancial development than those that require little capital. The results suggest that industries that depend 
on external ﬁ  nance grow almost 1 per cent faster, relative to industries with low external ﬁ  nancing depen-
dence, in episodes of globalization compared to episodes of repression. The evidence on the links between 
ﬁ  nancial liberalization and growth is not conclusive, however. Edison and others (2002), for example, 
using data from 57 countries from 1980 to 2000, conclude that there is no robustly signiﬁ  cant effect of 
ﬁ  nancial integration on economic growth.9 Similarly, Kraay (1998), using a sample of 117 countries, ﬁ  nds 
no effect of ﬁ  nancial liberalization on growth or, at best, mixed results. 
Perhaps the inability of past research to agree on the effects of ﬁ  nancial globalization on eco-
nomic growth lies in the fact that liberalization has time-varying effects on growth. Loayza and Ranciere 
(2002) present some evidence that suggests this might be the case. These authors estimate transitory and 
9  See Prasad and others (2003) for a review of the literature on the effects of ﬁ  nancial globalization on growth.
Table 2.
Correlations between the cyclical components 
  of macropolicies real GDP, and net capital inﬂ  ows
Correlations with real GDP Correlations with net capital inﬂ  ows
Fiscal policy Monetary policy Fiscal policy Monetary policy
Countries
Government




expenditure Inﬂ  ation tax
Lending
interest rate
OECD -0.13 0.16 0.23 0.03 0.04 0.19
Non-OECD 0.33 -0.15 -0.05 0.20 -0.16 -0.06
Source: Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh (2004).
Notes: A positive (negative) correlation between government expenditure (inﬂ  ation tax) and real GDP indicates pro-cyclical ﬁ  scal policy.  
A negative correlation between lending interest rates and real GDP indicates pro-cyclical monetary policy. A positive (negative) correlation 
between government expenditure (inﬂ  ation tax and lending interest rates) and net capital inﬂ  ows indicates that contractionary macropolicies 
are linked to episodes of low net capital inﬂ  ows.
The cyclical component of the various indicators was obtained using the HP ﬁ  lter.International Capital Flows, Financial Stability and Growth  19
trend effects of ﬁ  nancial deepening on growth using a sample of about 80 countries and ﬁ  nd that ﬁ  nancial 
deepening, which in general is closely related to ﬁ  nancial liberalization, harms growth in the short run but 
leads to higher growth in the long run. These latest results are closely linked to the results in Kaminsky 
and Schmukler (2002) and suggest that ﬁ  nancial liberalization triggers growth in the long run because it 
fuels institutional reform. 
Gourinchas and Jeanne (2002) also explore this theme and distinguish two classes of beneﬁ  ts of 
ﬁ  nancial globalization. The ﬁ  rst category includes beneﬁ  ts in terms of international allocative efﬁ  ciency, 
such as consumption smoothing in response to shocks or the possibility of accelerating domestic capital 
accumulation with the help of foreign capital. The second class of beneﬁ  ts encompasses incentives to 
implement good policies or reform that are generated by an open capital account. This includes impos-
ing market discipline on domestic macroeconomic policies induced by the threat of capital ﬂ  ight. More 
broadly, it can also include incentives to reform the domestic economic system in a way that reduces 
unproductive activities (diversion, rent-seeking) or secures better guarantees of property rights. To ex-
amine the relative importance of the beneﬁ  ts of international allocative efﬁ  ciency, the authors calibrate a 
simple neoclassical growth model of a small, open, capital-scarce economy with data on post-World War 
Two emerging economies. While they ﬁ  nd that ﬁ  nancial openness increases domestic welfare by allowing 
households to smooth consumption and by increasing the possibility of accelerating domestic capital ac-
cumulation, they also ﬁ  nd that the beneﬁ  ts are not very large when compared to the beneﬁ  ts of alternative 
policies that reduce domestic distortions or increase domestic productivity.10 
Managing international capital ﬂ  ows
The evidence seems to suggest that in the short run, globalization triggers the bankruptcy of ﬁ  nancial 
systems and protracted recessions. Even if capital inﬂ  ows do not trigger excess volatility in domestic 
ﬁ  nancial markets, it is still true that they trigger inﬂ  ation in the presence of a ﬁ  xed exchange-rate regime. 
Moreover, transitory capital inﬂ  ows may distort relative prices, with the domestic economy losing com-
petitiveness as a result of the appreciation of the real exchange rate. Therefore, policy makers have used a 
variety of tools to manage these ﬂ  ows, especially those of the “hot money” type. While they have intro-
duced capital controls in some cases, they have also resorted to sterilized intervention or have introduced 
ﬁ  scal austerity to help “sterilize” the expansive monetary effects of foreign-exchange purchases. Govern-
ments have also allowed more exchange-rate ﬂ  exibility to avoid a burst of inﬂ  ation during episodes of 
capital inﬂ  ows, in the knowledge that if the appreciation of the real exchange rate is unavoidable, it is 
better that it takes place through a nominal appreciation rather than through domestic inﬂ  ation. 
The effects of sterilized intervention and exchange-rate policy in the presence of large capital 
inﬂ  ow episodes have been documented extensively in Reinhart and Reinhart (1998). Emerging markets 
mostly peg their domestic currency, ﬂ  oating only in the immediate aftermath of crises (see Calvo and 
Reinhart, 2000). With ﬁ  xed exchange-rate regimes, capital inﬂ  ows trigger an accumulation of reserves 
by the central bank and an explosion of the monetary aggregates. To avoid inﬂ  ation, monetary authorities 
have to sterilize the effects of the intervention in the foreign-exchange market by selling securities in the 
domestic open market. Naturally, sterilization can only be effective if domestic and foreign assets are not 
close substitutes. The evidence for emerging markets suggests that while sterilization only has short-run 
10  The evidence in Arteta, Eichengreen and Wyplosz (2001) also suggests that the positive growth effects of liberali-
zation are stronger in countries with strong institutions, as measured by standard indicators of the rule of law.20  DESA Working Paper No. 10
effects (see Reinhart and Reinhart, 1998), many countries have resorted to sterilized intervention. Colom-
bia (during most of 1991), Indonesia (during 1991-1992) and Malaysia (during 1991-1993), for example, 
implemented open market operations on a vast scale to fully sterilize capital inﬂ  ows. Less strongly, but 
still forcefully, the central banks of Chile, South Korea, Mexico, the Philippines and Thailand partly steril-
ized the capital inﬂ  ows of the early and mid-1990s. 
In most cases, domestic short-term interest rates rose when sterilization began, suggesting that 
policy had an impact, at least in the short run. Interestingly, and at odds with the central banks’ initial 
purpose, strong sterilized intervention, by triggering large hikes in domestic interest rates, also triggered 
an increase in the volume of aggregate capital ﬂ  ows, mostly of the “hot money” type.11 Another disadvan-
tage of sterilized intervention was that the hikes in domestic interest rates also increased the cost of capital 
to the government, as the central banks acquired relatively low-yield foreign-exchange reserves and is-
sued high-yield sterilization bonds. In practice, these quasi-ﬁ  scal losses were not trivial. The central bank 
losses associated with the sterilization effort in Colombia in 1991, for example, reached about 0.6 per cent 
of GDP (see Rodriguez, 1992). Similarly, the losses in Chile due to the sterilization attempt during 1990-
1992 amounted to about 1.4 per cent of GDP (see Kiguel and Leiderman, 1993).
The explosion of capital inﬂ  ows to emerging markets in the early and mid-1990s were at ﬁ  rst 
counterbalanced through sterilized intervention. This intervention managed to avoid nominal appreciation 
or a hike in inﬂ  ation. As the inﬂ  ows persisted and as the foreign exchange reserves continued to accumu-
late, however, these policies became quite costly. At this point, central banks in Asia and Latin America 
allowed the exchange rate to move more freely so that the real appreciation was effected through a nomi-
nal appreciation rather than through a hike in domestic inﬂ  ation. As described in Reinhart and Reinhart 
(1998), Chile and Colombia allowed several appreciations in the midst of the capital inﬂ  ow episode. Chile 
allowed its currency to appreciate by 5 per cent in January 1992 and by 9.5 per cent in November 1994, 
for example. Similarly, Colombia allowed its currency to appreciate by 5 per cent in January 1994 and by 
7 per cent in November 1994. In addition to Chile and Colombia, the Czech Republic and Mexico also 
allowed their currencies to ﬂ  oat somewhat more freely. All of these countries widened their exchange-rate 
intervention bands in the early 1990s. 
Conclusion
The explosion of capital ﬂ  ows to emerging markets in the early and mid-1990s and the recent reversal fol-
lowing the crises around the globe have reignited a heated debate on how to manage international capital 
ﬂ  ows. Capital outﬂ  ows worry policy makers, but so do capital inﬂ  ows, as they may trigger bubbles in 
asset markets and lead to an appreciation of the domestic currency and a loss of competitiveness. Policy 
makers also worry that capital inﬂ  ows are mostly of the “hot money” type, which is why capital controls 
have mostly targeted short-term capital inﬂ  ows. While capital controls may work, at least in the very 
short run, the introduction of restrictions to capital mobility may have undesirable long-run effects. In 
particular, capital controls protect inefﬁ  cient domestic ﬁ  nancial institutions and thus may trigger ﬁ  nancial 
11  See Montiel and Reinhart (1999) for a study of 15 sterilization episodes in Africa, Asia, Latin America 
and transition economies, and Christensen (2005) for the analysis of the sterilization policy in the 
Czech Republic during the capital inﬂ  ow episode of the early 1990s. In both studies, the authors con-
clude that sterilization created a vicious circle of high interest rates, more capital inﬂ  ows and the need 
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vulnerabilities.12 Capital controls may also delay improvements in corporate governance of non-ﬁ  nancial 
ﬁ  rms because, as countries liberalize their capital accounts, domestic corporations start participating in 
international capital markets, mainly through cross-listing in major world stock exchanges, with higher 
disclosure standards and under the jurisdiction of a superior legal system. This certainly promotes more 
transparency in the management of the ﬁ  rm and can trigger improvements in corporate governance (see, 
for example, Stultz, 1999). Thus, regulation of capital ﬂ  ows may not only provoke ﬁ  nancial vulnerabili-
ties but also lower economic growth. Policy makers have also resorted to sterilization of capital ﬂ  ows to 
regain control of monetary policy. While sterilization may provide some relief, it may also be quite costly 
to central banks. Moreover, the ability of governments to control international capital ﬂ  ows or to sterilize 
them diminishes with globalization. 
In conclusion, there is no optimal policy to deal with the risks of volatile international capital 
ﬂ  ows, as policies that may work in the short run may have adverse effects in the long run. Since there is 
evidence that currency and banking crises tend to occur in economies with deteriorated fundamentals, 
conservative macroeconomic policies should be at the heart of dealing with volatile capital ﬂ  ows. Further 
research should examine whether countries can deregulate ﬁ  nancial systems without becoming vulnerable 
to crises. Since the costs of crises have been quite large, this last question deserves much attention.
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